Interview:
Engström on Sweden in space

Born Karlskrona, Sweden, 1939.
Masters degree, 1964, then PhD, 1971, Stockholm University.
1965-70, ESRO fellow, Culham Laboratory, UK.
1970, joined Teleutredningar in Stockholm.
1972-85, President, Swedish Space Corporation (SSC).
1985-94, joined ESA, directing Columbus project.
1994-2001, ESA Director of Launchers.

ESA: When was the turning point for Swedish politicians switching from being very reluctant about space to being pro-space?

Frederik Engström

I think it was 1972, the year of the Ministerial Conference where Sweden joined all the applications programmes. This was a surprise, even for Jan Stiernstedt (then Under-Secretary of the Research Ministry), I think. We joined all three programmes: telecommunications, Earth observation and launchers.

We used an argument that was somewhat different from the rest of Europe. First, to get Swedish politicians moving, we had to use an industrial argument. It had to be applications oriented. On the launcher side, it had to be very politically oriented, so we never said anything about wishing to explore the unknown.

We said that it would be good for industry and for Sweden, because we would get the industrial contracts. On the research side, it would also be beneficial for a small country like Sweden, on the edge of Europe, to establish networks all over Europe.

It was what Sweden needed and at the same time, as we can even see today - we are still not part of the euro zone - it was quite something to get into the Union. So we used arguments adapted to the Swedish situation. We were enthusiastic. We argued smartly on the points that they would listen to. If we had gone for the usual ‘discovering the unknown’ line at that time, Sweden would not have been receptive.

ESA: Can you tell us more about the creation of the Swedish space programme?

Frederik Engström

Yes, 1972 was a dramatic year. ESRO was instrumental to us starting the Swedish Space Corporation, which was a big step forward into space for Sweden. We were able to do this by taking over Esrange. Esrange was the key to getting started and so, beforehand, we planned to get Esrange operating at about the third of its cost at the time.

Then we started with the Swedish Space Corporation. At the same time the Swedish Board for Space Activities was created. These were hectic years for Klas Ånggård and me, but we were happy to be left to get on with things, as this gave us flexibility.

I remember when, for the first time, I had to present a programme budget to the Ministry of Industry and we had no clue how to go about drawing up such a budget. The task took us three days, but we did it. I think those budget principles still stand.

ESA: Did you have any support from industry?

Frederik Engström

Oh yes, they were all for it! Both Saab and Volvo were very enthusiastic. At Saab, it went right up to the President. They had very big plans and, I’m possibly mixing up dates, when we negotiated the Ariane deal, for instance, Saab were interested in the computer. Yves Sillard, then head of CNES, said, "That’s impossible, how can I trust Saab? They haven’t shown us what they can do!" In the end, he said, "OK, I will test you, you put up SEK 500 000," a mind-boggling sum for me, "And work for three months and then we will see." Saab actually did that, which was impressive because we really were in uncharted territory.

In parallel, Volvo Flygmotor had negotiated with Frederic d’Allest, who was second in command at CNES, without me knowing about it. They used their own political strengths to successfully place their contracts with Volvo Flygmotor.

Eventually, we got both Saab and Volvo Flygmotor on board. They achieved a great deal and, in the case of Volvo Flygmotor, they realised there were obvious benefits, especially the importance of the relationships with other firms. I believe both made very good choices because they are still in business 35 years later.

What was also important for Saab was that they were already in a consortium. They knew there was competition. Saab was a powerful company, there were not that many people around building their own aeroplanes, so they were also in favour of this consortium and they were very close to TRW and the Americans.

Saab’s dream at the time, which did not materialise, was to be able to compete in an international market. They thought they could build up an enormous business if they were allowed to compete in Europe.

They thought they were the greatest in the world, but I thought they were the greatest in Linköping. Regarding space, they still had a few things to learn. They were not bad though, and they were enthusiastic and confident.

ESA: What about Ericsson?

Frederik Engström

Ericsson had a much lower profile. Ericsson did not invest in space. They also suffered from the fact that their Technical Director never believed that satellites could be used in communications due to the half-second delay. I think this hampered them. He was always very supportive and enthusiastic, but did not believe in space communications. Their money was on the ground.

Ericsson’s structure as a whole was different and, at that time, intimately connected with the Swedish post office and telecommunications service. Their customer was the government. You could say the same for Saab, but Ericsson were more integrated with the government and so were more cautious and, I would say, safeguarded their main business.

That changed with mobile phones and maybe the situation is now different, but at the time the Swedish post office and telecommunications service formed a state within a state. They were really powerful and did whatever they liked.

ESA: What was Sweden's position on space in Europe, compared to the other Member States?

Frederik Engström

I think that, on the whole, the Swedish Delegation did not speak a great deal, but when it did it usually had something pertinent to say. At the time I was there, or when I was on the other side of the table, we participated in almost everything, we supported the Executive as a matter of principle. As a participant in most of the programmes and careful about its priorities, the Swedish Delegation was I think generally appreciated, at least by the ESA staff.

The other countries, at least in my time and afterwards, certainly regarded us as pro-French, which we were, unlike in 1972 when I came in and we had been pro-British. Håkansson's instruction to me when negotiating the new ESA Convention was, "Remember, when you don’t know how to vote, vote with the Brits." Which we did. That changed later so that we became much closer to the French. During the last few years, this has changed again. There are still strong bilateral ties with France but also now with Germany.

It was a bit difficult for me at the time to be Director of the Space Station because Sweden was not then participating in the programme. You could say it was an advantage in a way because you could not be suspected of being biased. But it was a weak point in my view. Towards the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, Sweden found it more and more difficult to obtain funding for space activities from the government.

ESA: Why do you think this was?

Frederik Engström

After 1994-95, the arguments we originally used had lost their force. You had IT, you had the commercial side of space, with telecommunication satellites and launchers (a semi-commercial business). We Europeans did well, but there was a lot of government effort behind it. Telecommunication satellites really became commercial.

Earth observation did not need to be commercial, but it was obvious that it was good for humankind and that argument carries weight in Sweden. I remember seeing Carl Bildt when he was Prime Minister then and we discussed what Sweden should do and he said that he wished to make a mark and show that Sweden was interested in Earth observation. And Sweden went in with 4% or thereabouts. He was an enthusiast about high-tech and space.

Otherwise the argument that space should be a major industrial sector in Sweden had disappeared. Defence is being dismantled. I think the argument in favour of Volvo Flygmotor being in Ariane is still valid. But all this takes time and interest waned. Extensive political influence was necessary to assert that Sweden should be in the Ariane programme for instance. There you needed political decisions because the bureaucrats didn’t see the value of it.

I still believe Sweden has a strong participation in the Science Programme and in Earth observation.